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TAYLOR V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO.

[So F. No. 16470.

[17

C.

(2d)

March,1941.]

In Bank.-March 11, 1941.J

ELEANOR TAYLOR, a Minor, etc., Respondent, V. OAK·
LAND SCAVENGER COMP ANY (a Corporation)
et al., Appellants.
[1] Automobiles - Operation - Conduct of Operator-Injuries Off
Highway-School Grounds.-A truck driver has a clear duty
of care towards pedestrians, and is required to exercise greater
caution in a school yard than in ordinary circumstances.
[2] Id.-Operation-Actions~Sufficiency of Evidence-Injuries
to Persons on Foot-School Grounds.-There was substantial
evidence to support the finding that the driver of the truck
into which the high school pupil ran as it was driven around a
blind corner of the gymnasium building was negligent where
he was familiar with the school grounds, and knew that children frequently ran across the area but, without sounding his
horn or giving other warning, drove around the corner 1lt a
rate of speed five miles in excess of the prima facie r;;peed
limit of the Vehicle Code.
[3] Schools - Actions, etc.-Liability - Injuries to Pupils.-It is
the duty of school authorities to supervise the conduct of children on the school grounds and to enforce rules and regulations necessary to their protection. A school district is liable
for injuries which result from the failure of its officers and
employees to use ordinary care in such respect.
[4] Id.-Actions, etc.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by a high school pupil who ran into a
garbage truck at a blind corner upon the school grounds, the
evidence justified a finding of negligence of the school district
where it established that the principal of the high school knew
for seven years of the practice of students to surge out of the
gymnasium and run to the playground, that school authorities
took no precautions to minimize the danger of· injury to
students after motor trucks had entered the grounds other
4. See 23 Cal. Jur. 110.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Automobiles, § 111; 2. Automobiles,
§ 231; 3,5. Schools, § 68; 4. Schools, § 74; 6,8,10. Schools, § 75;
7. Automobiles, § 335; 9. Trial, § 141; 11. Negligence, § 19; 12.
Negligence, § 238; 13. Negligence, § 52 (1); 14. Schools, § 76; 15.
Master and Servant, § 206; 16. Independent Contractors, § 22;
17. Automobiles, § 174; 18. Evidence, § 102; 19. Appeal, § 1536-2;
20. Damages, § 102.

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]
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than to issue an instruction to caution people to drive carefully, did not post a danger sign or warning to students against
running about the courtyard and permitted trucks to drive on
the schools grounds at all times subject only to safety provisions of the Vehicle Code.
Id.-Actions, etc.-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Foreseeableness of InjurY.-As respects injuries to a high school pupil
who ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner of the school
grounds, it was not necessary to prove that the very injury
which occurred must have been foreseeable by school authorities, in order to establish that their failure to provide safeguards constituted negligence, since their negligence is established if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that
injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in
absence of such safeguards.
Id.-Actions, etc.-Actions-Trial-Instructions.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by a high school pupil who
ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner upon the school
grounds, the assertion that the trial court erroneously failed
to instruct on the right of the school authorities to rely on
the provisions of the Vehicle Code was untenable where such
matter was covered by an instruction that the provisions of the
Vehicle Code are applicable to vehicles on school grounds in
the absence of special regulations, and that the question as to
whether school authorities should have imposed special regulations and conditions governing traffic on the grounds was
one of fact to be determined in light of the conditions existing at the time of the accident.
Automobiles - Operation - Actions_Instructions-Care and
Conduct of Operators-Care Toward Persons on Foot-School
Grounds.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by a
high school pupil who ran into a garbage truck at a blind
corner upon the school grounds, the court did not erroneously
instruct the jury that the driver of the truck was not obligated to follow the provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable
to the circumstances, where it quoted relevant sections of the
Vehicle Code, told the jury that such provisions were applicable to traffic on school grounds in absence of special regulations, and further instructed that the driver had a clear duty
to drive his truck on school grounds at a reasonable and proper
speed in the circumstances, with special regard to the probability of encountering school children.
Schools-Actions, etc.-Actions-Trial-Instructions.-In an
action for personal injuries sustained by a high school pupil
when she ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner upon the
school grounds, instructions that the general provisions of the
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Vehicle Code may be inadequate for situations arising on
school grounds were not error.
[9] Trial- Instructions - Manner of Giving - Substitution of
Proper Instruction.-The withdrawing of an instruction which
omitted an essential element, te~reading it to the jury, and
instructing them to disregard it, and then reading a proper
instruction in its place was not improper or reversible error.
[10] Schools - Actions, etc.~Actions - Trial-Instructions.~An
instruction in the language of School Code, section 2.801, respecting liability of a school district for negligence of its
officers and employees did not impose a greater burden on the
district than that enjoined by law, nor did it make the district
an insurer of the safety of its pupils, where it expressly
stated that the district was not an insurer and that the school
authorities were required to exercise ordinary care only.
[11] Negligence - Proximate Oause ~ Concurrent Oause.-If an
injury is produced by the concurrent effect of two separate
wrongful acts, each is a proximate cause of the injury, and
neither can operate as an efficient intervening cause with regard to the other. The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate the occurrence of the other concurrent cause
will not shield him from liability so long as his own negligence
was one of the causes of the injury.
[12] Id.-Review-Questions of Law and Fact-Rule Where Evidence is Oonflicting - Ooncurrent Negligence.-Where more
than one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the conflicting evidence, the determination of the jury that the negligence of each defendant contributed concurrently to the
plaintiff's injury cannot be disturbed on appeal.
[13] ld.-Exercise of Oare by Particular Persons-Infants-Degrees of Oare Required.-A high school pupil fifteen years of
age who was injured when she ran into a garbage truck at a
blind corner upon the school grounds Was bound only to that
duty of care which a normal child of the same age would be
expected to exercise in such a situation.
[14] Schools-Actions, etc.-Actions-Appeal-Questions of Fact.
Whether a flfteen year old girl in a physical education class
on grounds of a high school, used mainly for school activities
and not as a thoroughfare for automobiles, exercised proper
caution in running across the courtyard toward the athletic
field without being on the alert for the sudden appearance of a
9. See 24 Oal. Jur. 867; 14 R. O. L. 812.
11. See 19 Oal. Jur. 572; 22 R. O. L. 128.
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garbage truck into which she tan, was a question for the jury
where the appellate court could not say as a matter of law
that the jury was unjustified in finding her free from fault.
[15] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Relation of
Parties-Ilmployee or Independent Oontractor.-An employer
is generally,liable for negligent acts of an employee performed
within scope of employment, but if an independent contractor
rather than master and servant relationship exists, the independent contractor usually is alone liable for his negligent
acts.
[16] Independent Oontractors-Liability of Employer-Exceptions
to Rule-In General.-If a contractor undertakes to carry on
an activity involving possible danger to the public under a
license or franchise granted by public authority, subject to
obligations or liabilities imposed by the authority, such liabilities may not be evaded by delegating performance to an independent contractor. In such case the original contractor
remains subject to liability for harm caused by the negligence
of the independent contractor employed' to do the work.
[17] Automobiles - Operation - Persons Liable-Employer-Acts
of Independent Oontractors.-Where a scavenger company was
franchised by a city to carryon an activity requiring the
operation of large motor vehicles upon the public streets which
involved the risk of danger to the public and the city by ordinance and contract required that the company must assume
master and servant liability for the acts of its garbage collectors, the ordinance and contract fixed a liability upon the
company for damages for injuries to the public which it
could not escape by delegating performance to an independent
contractor.
[18] Evidence-Admissibility-Insutance Against Loss-Limitations on Rule.-A contract otherwise admissible in evidence is
not tendered inadmissible because of an incidental disclosure
therein that insurance against loss was carried.
[19] Appeal~Determination-HarIl'1less and Reversible ErrorArgument and Oonduct of Oounsel-Examination of Wit~
nesses.-Misconduct of counsel in questioning a witness concerning an attempt to photograph the plaintiff without her
knowledge was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal, especially since the trial court refused to grant a new
trial on such ground.
[20] Damages-Inadequate and Excessive Damages-Damages not
Excessive - Injur.y to Leg or Knee - Foot.-An award of
$25,000, reduced by the trial court to $20,000, was not excessive
where the plaintiff, a girl fifteen years of age, sustained an
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injury which tore the sale lose from her foot in such manner
as to render' the foot permanently defE!ctive with a possibility
of ultimate loss.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County: Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph E. Hoyt, District Attorney, Charles V. Barfield and
Appelbaum & Mitchell for Appellant Oakland High School
District.
Weinmann, Quayle & Berry for Appellant Oakland Sca'Vehger Company et a1.
Elliott Johnson and Crozier C. Culp for Respo~dent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, a fifteen year old girl was enrolled in the Castlemont High School in Oakland ~here she
took the required course in physical education. On September29, 1936, she and other members of the class assembled in the gymnasium, changed from street to gymnasium clothes,and received instructions from the teacher to
go outdoors into the athletic neld to play volley ball. As was
. their custom, most of the members of the class surged out
of the gymnasium and commenced rUnning to the field.
Plaintiff took the lead, followed closely by a classmate, and
ran nortl1- in a passageway between the main high school
building and the gymnasium. .As she approached the northeast corner of the gymnasium, a blind corner, a garbage truck
came around the corner without warning and turned toward
her at a rate of about twenty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff,
unable to stop herself, struck the truck at the cab door and
was k;nocked to the pavement. While in that position the
. right rear wheel of the truck ran over .her left foot and tore
the sole loose from the foot in such a manner as to render
her foot permanently defective with a possibility of ultimate
loss.
Plaintiff brought suit against Albert Santucci, the drivel'
of the truck j Oresti Santucci, the oWner of the truck j the
Oakland Scavenger Company, under contract with the city
to collect and dispose of garbage j and the Oakland High
School District. She claimed that the truck was driven in
a negligent manner, that the owner of'the truck was an em-

March,1941.]

TAYt.oR v. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO.

599

ployee of the Oakland Scavenger Company, and that the
school district was negligent in failing to take adequate precautionary measures to prevent such accidents.
The judgment of the trial court which sustained without
leave to amend a demurrer of the defendant Oakland High
School District was reversed by this court on appeal. (12
Cal. (2d) 310 [83 Pac. (2d) 849].) Upon a trial of the case
the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $25,000
against all of the· defendants. The trial court denied a motion for a neW trial on the condition. that plaintiff accept a
reduction of the amount to $20,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. All defendants have appealed.
'l.'he school district claims that there is no evidence establishing negligence on its part and' that the negligence of the
truck driver was an efficient intervening cause insulating
it from liability. The Santuccis and the Oakland Scavenger
Company claim that there is no evidence establishing the
negligence of the dri'Ver of the truck, that the negligence of
the scho()l district is an efficient intervening cause insulating
them from liability, that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting certain evidence, and that plaintiff's counsel was guilty of prejudicial misconduc( The Oakland Scavenger Company further denies liability on the
grOUnd that the owner of the truck was an independent contractor and n()t an employee. In addition,. all of the defendants assert that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, that the trial court erred in giving
certain instructions and withholding others, and that the
damage award is excessive as a matter of law.
[1, 2] There is substantial evidence to support the finding by the jury that the driver of the truck was negligent;
A driver has a clear duty of care toward pedestrians, and
he is required to exercise greater caution in a school yard
than under ordinary circumstances. (Lampton v. Davis S.
Bread 00., 48 CaL App. 116 [191 Pac. 710].) He was
,familiar with the courtyard where the accident occurred, and
,knew that children frequently ran across the area. He
nevertheless drove around the blind corner without sounding·
his horn or giving other warning at a rate of about twentyfive miles per hour, five miles in excess of the prima facie
.speed limit set by the Vehicle Code, thereby causing' injury to
, the plaintiff.
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[3, 4] There is likewise sufficient evidence to' justify the
finding Df negligence Dn the part Df defendant SChDDl district. It is the dutYDf the' SChDDl authDrities to' supervise
at all times the conduct Df the children Dn the SChDDl grDunds
and to' enforce thDse rules and regulatiDns necessary to their
prDtection. (Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist.,
11 Cal. (2d) 576 [81 Pac. (2d) 894] ; Ogando v. Carquinez G.
School Dist., 24 Cal. App. (2d) 567 [75 Pac. (2d) 641].)
The SChDDl district is liable for injuries which result from
a failure of its officers and emplDyees to use ordinary care
in this respect. (Ibid.) The e'\Tidence in this case establishes that the principal Df the CastlemDnt High School knew
for seven years of the practice of students in physical educatiDn classes to surge Dut of the gymnasium and run alDng
the cDurtyard to' the playgrDund. The school authDrities
likewise knew that at least six delivery trucks came into the
. grounds every mDrning, seven other trucks once a week, and
five more trucks every week or twO'. They nevertheless took
no precautions to' minimize the danger of injury to the
students after the trucks had entered the grounds other
than to issue an instructiDn to the custDdian of the grounds
to' supervise the traffic that came Dn the grounds and to'
caution people to drive carefully. They failed to PDst a
danger sign or to' warn the students against running across
the eourtyard. The eighteen trucks were permitted to drive
Dn the SChODl grDunds at all times subject to nO' safety regulations other than the general prDvisions Df the Vehicle Code.
I I The question whether there has been neglig{lnce in permitting vehicles Dn SChDDl premises subject only to the prDvisions of the Vehicle CDde relating to' traffic on the highways
is to be determined on the facts of each case." (Taylor v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., 12 Cal. (2d) 310 [83 Pac. (2d)
948].) [5] It is not necessary to prove that the very injury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school
authorities in order to establish that their failure to' provide
additional safeguards constituted negligence; Theil' negligence is established if a reasonably prudent, persO'n would
foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely
to' happen in the absence of such safeguards.
[6] The school district contends that the trial court
failed to instruct the jury that if the school authorities were
justified in relying upon the provisions of the Vehicle Code
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as adequate for the protection of the children on the grounds
and were nDt guilty Df any negligence, the SChDDl district
wDuld not be liable. The trial cDurt, hDwever, cDvered this
matter when it instructed the jury that the only basis fDr
impDsing liability Dn the SChDDl district is the negligence of its
Dfficers Dr emplDyers,that the prDvisiDns of the Vehicle CDde
are applicable to' vehicles Dn the SChDDl grDunds in the absence Df special regulatiDns, and that the question whether
the SChDDl authorities shDuld have impDsed special regulations
and cDnditions governing traffic on the grounds is Dne Df fact
to be determined in light Df the conditiDns existing at the
time Df the accident. [7] NDr is there merit in the argument
Of the SChDDl district that the trial CDurt errDneDusly instructed
the jury that the driver Df the truck was nDt Dbligated to'
fDllDW the provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable to the
circumstances. The court quoted the relevant sections Df the
Vehicle Code to the jury, told them that such provisions were
applicable to traffic Dn the school grounds in the absence of
special regulations, and further instructed them that the
driver of the truck had a clear duty to drive his truck on the
school grDunds "at a careful and prudent speed, not greater
than was reasonable and proper, under all the circumstances
then and there eXisting, with special regard to the probability
of encountering schoDI children, moving, proceeding, walking
or running upon said grounds and premises."
[8] The trial court's use of language from the opinion of
this court when this case was before it on demurrer (Taylor v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., supra) in its instructiDns to the jury
that the general provisions of the Vehicle Code may be inade- .
quate for situations arising on school grounds likewise does
not constitute error. The instruction was sound as a :inatter
of law,and left to the jury the determination of the facts.
[9] One of the instructions to the jury as first given
omitted the element Df proximate cause. The trial court subsequently withdrew the erroneous instruction, re~read it to'
the members of the jury, told them to' disregard it, and issued
a proper Dne in its place. This methDd of substitutiDn of
instructions, the only prR0tical one available to the court,
does not constitute prejudicial error. (See 24 Cal. JUl'. 867.)
[10J In i:nstructing the jury that the school district was
liable for the negligence of its officers and employees, the
trial court used the language' employed in section 2.801 of
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the School Code and therefore did not impose a greater bur·
den on the school district than that enjoined by law. Neither
did it make the school district an insurer of the safety of its
pupils, for it expressly instru<lted the jury that the district
was not an insurer of the pupils and that the school authorities were required to exercise only ordinary care. Taken as
a whole the instructions to the jury present the proper legal
principles and contain no prejudicial error.
The school district maintains, however, that any breach
of duty on the part of its employees was not a proximate cause
of the injury to plaintiff because the negligence of the truck
driver was an efficient intervening cause. Conversely, the
Santuccis and the Scavenger Company contend that any
breach of duty on the part of the truck driver was not a
proximate cause of the injury because the negligence of the
school authorities was an efficient intervening cause. [11]
If an injury is produced by the concurrent effect of two separate wrongful acts, each is a proximate cause of the injury,
and neither can operate as an efficient intervening cause with
regard to the other. (Rest., Torts, sees. 432 (2),439; .Lacy v.
Pacific Gas &; Electric 00., 220 Cal. 97 [29 Pac. (2d) 781];
Smith v. Schwartz, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 160 (57 Pac. (2d)
1386].) The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate the occurrence of the other concurrent cause will not
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence was
one of the causes of the injury. (H erro1t v. Smith Bros., Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 518 (2 Pac. (2d) 1012] ; Sawdey v. Producers'
Milk 00. et al., 107 Cal. App. 467 [290 Pac. 684].) [12]
The arguments of defendants themselves make clear that
more than one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the
conflicting evidence of this case, and the determination of
the jury that the negligence of each defendant contributed
concurrently to the plaintiff's injury cannot therefore be disturbed on appeal. (Lacy v. Pacific Gas &; Electric 00.,
supra; Smith v. Schwartz, StLpra.)
[13, 14] The defendants are united, however, in the contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. The jury found plaintiff not guilty of
contributory negligence. " Contributory negligence is a question of law only when the court is impelled to say that from
the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference, and
that an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of

---~------
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the plaintiff contributing to his injury." (Smellie v. So.
00., 212 CaL 540 at 562 [299 Pac. 529J ; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374 [268 Pac. 369].) Plaintiff is bound
only to that duty of. care which a normal child of the same
age would be expected to exercise in such a situation. (Anderson v. Walters, 135 Cal. App. 380 [27 Pac. (2d) 100];
19 Cal. JUl'. 605.) The question is not whether plaintiff must be viewed as an adult or as a child but simply
whether the plaintiff as a fifteen year old girl in a physical
education class on the grounds. of a high school, used mainly
for school activities and not as a thoroughfare for automobiles, exercised propel' caution in running across the courtyard toward the athletic field without being on the alert for
the sudden appearance of a motor vehicle. The answer is
not so obvious that this court can say as a matter of law that
the jury was unjustified in finding plaintiff free from fault
(Shannon v. Central-Gaither U. School Dist., 133 Cal. App.
124 [23 Pac. (2d) 769]), particularly when the record shows
that plaintiff had never seen automobiles or trucks pass the
gymnasium while children were on the school grounds. There
is evidence indicating that it was customary for most of the
children in the physical education classes to run across the
courtyard to the athletic field. To hold that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law is to
hold that a majority of average children in a like situation
have been acting in a negligent manner, result which contradicts the very standard utilized in determining the exist"
ence of negligence.
[15--17] The Oakland Scavenger Company contends that
under its contract with Oresti Santucci the latter was an independent contractor and that it therefore is not liable for any
negligence of the truck driver. It points out that the truck
Was not owned by it but by Santucci and that it exercised little
supervision or control over the collection and disposal of the
garbage by Santucci. Plaintiff introduced in evidence not
only the garbage ordinance of the City of Oakland (852
N. S.), which makes it unlawful for any per!\on other than a
contractor with the city or a person in the employ of such
contractor to collect garbage within the city, but the contrMt between the City of Oakland and the Oakland Scavenger
Company in which it was agreed that any person collecting
garbage for the Scavenger Company was to be considered an
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employee of such company. Plaintiff introduced also the
contract between the Oakland Scavenger Company and Oresti
Santucci which is expressly made subject to all regulations
and ordinances of the City of Oakland, as well as to the requirements of other contracting parties with the Scavenger
Company. It requires Oresti Santucci to keep his trucks insured against damage to persons and property in order to
protect the Scavenger Company from any claim that might
arise against it because of his accidental or wilful misconduct,
to keep his truck numbered and painted in a uniform color
to be determined by the Scavenger Company, and to supply
his collectors with a special badge bearing a serial number
determined by the Scavenger Company.
An employer is generally liable for negligent acts of an
employee performed within the scope of employment, but
if an independent contractor rather than master and servant relationship exists, the independent contractor usually
is alone liable for his negligent acts. If, however, an individual or corporation undertakes to carryon an activity
involving possible danger to the public under a license or franchise granted by public authority subject to certain obligations or liabilities imposed by the public authority, these
liabilities may not be evaded by delegating performance to
. an independent contractor. The original contractor remains
subject to liability for harm caused by the negligence of the
independent contractor employed to do the work. (Rest.,
Torts., secs. 417, 428; Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal.
622 [299 Pac. 720] ; Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal. 162 [103 Pac.
866]; Oolgrove v. Smith, 102 Cal. 220 [36 Pac. 411, 27
L. R. A. 590] ; Spe'IWe v. Schultz, 103 Cal. 208 [37 Pac. 220] ;
Ohicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139 [48
N. E. 66]; Ootton v. Ship-By Truck 00., 337 Mo. 270 [85
S. W. (2d) 80,81] ; West v. St. Louis et al., 63 Ill. 545; Murray v. Lehigh Valley R. 00., 66 Conn. 512 [34 Atl. 506, 32
L. R. A. 539] ; 39 C. J. 1338.) The Oakland Scavenger Company was franchised by the city to carryon an activity requiring@le operation of large motor vehicles upon the publi~
streets which clearly involved the risk of danger to the publi<J
The city, by ordinance and by contract with the Scavenger
Company, enunciated a rule of policy to the effect that as a
condition of exercising the franchise the Scavenger Company
must assume master and servant liability for the acts of per-
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sons engaged by it to collect garbage. Both the ordinance
and the contract are admissible to establish this rule of policy.
While they do not establish that Sl\ntucci was an employee
of the Scavenger Company rather than an independent contractor, they fix a liability upon the Scavenger Company
which it cannot escape by delegating performance to an independent contractor.
[18] Plaintiff introduced the contract between the Scavenger Company and Oresti Santucci for the purpose of showing that these parties themselves contemplated an employeremployee relationship. The Scavenger Company remains
liable whether or not this contract actually established such a
relationship, but plaintiff could properly introduce the contract in evidence in an attempt to establish the existence of
a master and servant relationship as one basis of liability.
The incidental disclosure by the contract that Santucci was
insured does not render it inadmissible since proper grounds
exist for its admission. (Schellenberg v. Southern Cal. Music
Co., 139 Cal. App. 777 [35 Pac. (2d) 156]; Perry v. A. Paladini, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 275 [264 Pac. 580].)
[19] Any misconduct which may have existed on the part
of plaintiff's attorney in questioning one of defendants' witnesses concerning an attempt to photograph the plaintiff
without her knowledge is not sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversal, especially since the trial court refused to grant
a new trial on this ground. (See Imlay v. California Cab
Co., 124 Cal. App. 68 [11 Pac. (2d) 1116J; Alberts v. Lytle,
1 Cal. App. (2d) 682 [37 Pac. (2d) 705].)
[20] In view of the serious injury to plaintiff's foot
with the accompanying pain, worry, embarrassment and restriction of activity, as well as the possibility of eventual loss
of the foot, the damages as finally assessed by the trial court
are not excessive as a matter of law.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Gibson, C. J., con.
curred.

